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2This paper presents, for the first time, capital stock and input series for Spain from 1850 to
2000. In Section 1 we present the methods and data sources used to derive the new series of
capital stock and input, while in Section 2 sensitivity tests for alternative methods to computing
capital stock are provided including a comparison between our new estimates and earlier ones.
Historical trends in capital stock and input are offered in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, capital
deepening and productivity in Spain are discussed in international perspective.
Methods and data sources
Our approach to measuring physical capital accumulation in Spain follows the method
developed by Jorgenson (1989, 1990) and Hulten (1990) and, hence, our measure, capital input, is
not necessarily identical to the one usually employed in national accounting.2 Conventionally the
stock of capital is defined as all tangible goods that can be used during more than one period to
produce other goods and services. More specifically, the capital stock comprises residential and
non-residential structures, transport equipment, and producer durable equipment (machinery and
equipment).3 The input of capital results, then, from the combination of the capital stock, and its
service, which is the capital remuneration (property compensation) in production outlay.4
a) Capital stock
2 OECD (1993). For applications of the Jorgenson/Hulten approach, cf. Christensen, Cummings,
and Jorgenson (1980), Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987), Elías (1990), Young (1995) and,
for the case of Spain, Myro (1983) and Cebrián (2001)
3 Consequently, intangible goods (like licenses, patents and property rights), non-reproducible
goods (like monuments, pieces of art and natural resources), consumer durables, military goods,
inventories and intermediate products are not part of our capital stock measure.
4 Major advantages of this method are that follows the concept of aggregate production function
and, hence, is consistent with general equilibrium conditions and adjusts to changes in the
composition or ‘quality’ of capital (defined as the ratio between capital input and stock) as we
weight each of the capital input components by its marginal product. See Hulten (1992).
3National accounts document flows of new capital to be added to actual stock in the year
(It), but do not record the actual amount of capital stock in use (Ct). Since capital stocks result
from the accumulation of investment flows, social accountants developed the Perpetual Inventory
Method (PIM) to infer capital stock from past years additions of capital assets.5
Thus, the stock of capital, Ct, evolves according to the value, at constant prices, of the new
investments during that year and depreciation and reposition rates.
(1) Ct = (1 -t) Ct -1 + It
Where the capital stock C in the year t equals the amount of existent capital at the year t-1
multiplied by 1 minus depreciation rate () at the year t, plus gross fixed capital formation, I at the
year t.
The use of the PIM method to computing capital stock series requires: (a) historical series
of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) by type of assets, at constant prices; (b) an initial
benchmark for the stock of capital; and (c) the efficiency of each vintage of capital.
(a) Disaggregated volume and price series of GFCF by asset type (residential buildings;
other constructions; transport equipment; and machinery and equipment) from 1850 to 2000 are
available (Prados de la Escosura 2003).
b) However, there is no capital stock (C0) for each type of asset j at the initial year 1850. In
order to derive the initial stock we require information on investment levels and growth rates for
the previous years, as well as depreciation rates.6 More specifically, if investment at the year t is
defined as:
5 More specifically, the PIM approach produces an estimate of the stock of fixed assets in
existence by estimating how many fixed assets installed have survived to the current period. Cf.
Diewert (1980), Jorgenson (1973, 1980), and Hulten (1990)
6 Alternative procedures to derive the initial level of capital stock include: the direct computation
from the cumulative investment during the past years, surveys or censuses on the capital stock for
a given year, and retrospective calculations as the one proposed by Feinstein (1972: 196-8).
4(2) It= (+r) Ct -1
Whereis depreciation rate, r is the rate of variation for net investment, and Ct-1 is capital
stock in the previous year. Thus, solving for capital stock, the following expression is obtained:
(3) Ct-1 = It / (+r)
In order to compute C for the year 1849, investment levels (It) for 1850, depreciation rates
() for each asset type (see Table 2) are available, while the yearly rates of variation for capital
stock (r) could be proxied by the average growth rate of GFCF in the 1850s.7
A caveat is necessary though. It seems plausible enough that the growth of investment was
significantly slower in the early nineteenth century than in the 1850s (the decade in which
railways construction started in Spain) and that, consequently, by following this procedure we
may bias downwards the initial level of the stock of capital. As an alternative, we have arbitrarily
assumed an initial capital stock twice as high the one derived with expression (3) (see next section
for a sensitivity test).
We have also taken into account the destruction of capital assets as a consequence of the
Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Capital series derived through the PIM method capture the decline
in their level over 1935-40 for some assets. This is the case, for example, of machinery and
equipment, merchant shipping, buildings, railways, and roads. Unfortunately, no exhaustive
census on war destruction exists and, for this reason, we had to resort to many individual studies
for the rest of them.8 We started from the available estimates of destruction for specific assets that
7 Following Young (1995: 651-2), we assumed that, for each type of asset, investment growth in
the earlier years for which information is available (that is, the 1850s) are representative of
investment growth rates in the pre-1850 period. Thus, we used the investment growth rates over
1850/54-1855/59 in our calculations. Baigès et al. (1987) also employed this approach.
8 We tried to follow as closely as possible assessments of war destruction by Ros Hombravella et
al. (1973), Barciela (1986) and, especially, Catalan (1995), together with specific estimates from a
wide variety of sector studies. Thus, López Carrillo (1998), Appendix. 3, provides estimates of the
5have been distributed at an annual cumulative rate over 1936-39.9 The total war destruction was
equivalent to 7 percent of the capital stock and to one-fourth of the productive capital (that is total
capital excluding dwellings) in the 1935, because destruction was disproportionately concentrated
in transport equipment (40 percent) and to lesser extent in machinery and equipment (13 percent),
as opposed to buildings and infrastructures that escaped relatively unscathed (with 4 and 6 percent
losses). Thus, the Civil War had a deeper impact on capital input, that is, the service provide to
production by the stock of capital, than on the capital stock itself. Interestingly, the destruction of
capital in Spain during the Civil War would be on the lower bound of World War II destruction:
comparable to that of France (8 percent) but much lower than in Germany (16 percent) or Japan
(26 percent) (Maddison 1991: 284-92).
c) Information on capital efficiency has rarely been observed and, hence, social
accountants have resorted to indirect methods to infer the efficiency of capital units (Hulten
1990). A widely employed procedure is assuming that all efficiency patterns () follow a pattern
determined by the observable lives (T) of capital goods. Among different, the simplest one
reduction in motor vehicles between 1935 an 1940. Railways’ rolling stock destroyed can be
deduced from Gómez Mendoza (1989) figures weighted by the prices of each type of asset.
Muñoz Rubio (1995) presents estimates of structures and rolling stock of the two main railways
companies, Norte and MZA. Nelson Álvarez kindly provided us with figures that allowed us to
estimate the destruction of telephone networks (equipment and structures). Moreover, available
data on installed electric power (Carreras 1989) and the number of urban dwellings (Tafunell
1989) allowed us to complete our crude assessment of capital destruction during the Civil War.
9 An earlier attempt to estimate the destruction of capital stock during the Civil War was carried
out by Cubel and Palafox (1997) who distributed linearly the destroyed assets during the war
years to keep consistency with the arithmetic rate of depreciation they used to compute capital
stock.
6assumes that capital goods maintained their efficiency levels constant across their lives. The
problem would, then, be reduced to estimate the useful lives of capital assets (T).
The useful lives assumed for each type of asset derive from available information for
Spain, the United States and Britain (Table 1), are in line with those used in major historical
works such as Feinstein (1972, 1988), and tend to be on the conservative (high) side when
compared with available studies for the late twentieth century. In the case of ‘productive’ capital
(namely, non-residential structures, equipment and machinery), as assets lives tend to shorten as
one gets closer to the present10 , different service lives have been attributed to assets during three
distinctive epochs (1850-1919, 1920-1959, and 1960-2000. In the years 1920-59, that included the
interwar and the autarchic periods, the renewal of old capital vintages was hampered by
restrictions to international trade and factor mobility, and war, and this helps to explain why
useful lives were longer than from 1960 onwards, when the growing integration of Spain into the
international economy justifies the assumed reduction in the service lives of assets.
[Table 1]
We have employed the so called modified geometric depreciation rates.11 The depreciation
rate () is defined as=X/T, where X is a parameter (declining balance) and T is the life of each
type of asset. The parameter X is, according to Hulten and Wykoff (1981), 1.65 for machinery and
10 Cf. Feinstein (1988), Blades (1993), and O’Mahony (1996: 173). Only in the case of buildings we
have assumed a fixed useful life over the entire period considered.
11 This ‘modified’ geometric depreciation pattern is somewhere in between the arithmetic and geometric
depreciation patterns, that is, it moves between one and two times the inverse of asset lives. Cf.
Jorgenson (1990). See a comparison between alternative capital stock estimates derived by using
arithmetic (X = 1) and modified geometric depreciation in Section 2 below.
7equipment and 0.91 for buildings and structures.12 Using the service lives presented in Table 1 we
derived the depreciation rates to be used in our calculations, by asset type and period (Table 2).
[Table 2]
b) Capital input
The input of capital can be defined as the flow of services provided by the stock of capital
to production. Thus, at year t, the capital input, K, is proportional to the stock of capital, C, at the
end of the period t-1:
(4) Kt =· Ct-1,
Where a proportionality constant () transforms capital stock into capital services.
Thus, in addition to the stock of capital, we need estimates of the rental price of capital (or
price of capital services) and of total returns to capital (or value of capital services) in order to
construct a single index of capital input by weighting the quantity of each asset with its share in
total returns to capital.
Assuming that old a nd new vintages of capital are perfect substitutes (Jorgenson 1990),
the rental price of capital (pk) in year (t), can be estimated, following Hall and Jorgenson (1967),
as:
(5) 1)]-(tp-(t)p[-(t)p+1)r(t)-(tp=(t)p iiiik 
Where pi is the investment price of the capital good i, r is the nominal rate of return, andδi
is the depreciation rate for the capital good i. The rental price of capital is, thus, the sum of the
12 The values of the parameter were derived from a careful econometric exercise in which a large
data base was used. Accepting the X parameter’s values from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) for
historical purposes is, nonetheless, arbitrary. It is worth noting that these parameters have been
widely employed in empirical studies as they correspond to the technological frontier to which
countries tend to converge. In his pioneer contribution, Myro (1983) employed also a modified
geometric depreciation rate but assumed X = 1.5.
8return per unit of capital, 1)r(t)-(tpi , the depreciation, (t)pi , and the negative of revaluation,
1)]-(tp-(t)p[ ii ( Jorgenson (1989: 10).
We have already established the depreciation rates13 and the acquisition price of capital,
but we do not know the rates of return (r). There are two alternative methods to impute the
nominal rate of return. The first uses the long-run interest rate as equivalent to the competitive
benefit rate. The second derives the rate of return from the share of national income received by
the owners of capital assets as a compensation for their property.14 In order to maintain the
consistency with our previous assumptions we have used the competitive rate of return.
We have approximated the competitive rate of return with the long-run interest rate.
The internal rate of return of private liabilities (from the MOISSES and BDMORES databases
(Dabán et al. 1998)), was used as a proxy for the long-term interest rate since 1954; the corporate
rate of return was employed for 1880-1954 (Tafunell 2001); and, finally, the net rate of return on
domestic public debt for 1857-1880 (Tafunell 1989), was projected backwards to 1850 with the
interest rate of Banco de Barcelona (Tortella 1973).
Total returns to capital are, then, obtained, as the product of the rental price of capital by
the quantity of capital stock, and are equal to capital property compensation. This way we can
13 We have derived the aggregate depreciation rate weighting the specific rates of depreciation for
each asset class by the corresponding amount of capital. The deflators of GFCF for each category
of capital goods, conveniently de-trended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, provide the remaining
information.
14 Under the assumption that rates-of-return are identical across all types of capital investment, r
could be directly computed employing the same equation (5) given that the aggregate rental of
capital goods is equivalent to property compensation; that is, the remuneration of capital in
aggregate value added. Observable differences between the actual nominal rate of return,
computed with property compensation, and competitive nominal rates of return, measured with
long-run interest rates, provide a direct measure of monopolistic rents gained by proprietors.
9derive the share of each type of asset in the total returns to capital that will be used as weights in
the computation of the capital input index. It can be observed that a capital good with a higher
amortization rate receives a larger weight in the index of capital input (machinery is, for example,
allocated a higher weight than dwellings) than in the capital stock (compare Figures 5 and 7). The
implication is that changes in the composition of the stock from long duration (and low rate of
return) to short duration (and high rate of return) capital goods represent an increase in the quality
of capital.
The final step is to construct a capital input index by combining the quantity of each asset
with its share in total returns to capital. To construct yearly indices, we expressed capital input at
year t (Kt), as a translogarithmic function of its four components (residential and non-residential
structures, transport equipment, and machinery and equipment)). The corresponding
translogarithmic capital input index, under the assumption of constant returns to scale, is:
(6)
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If we take log-first-differences in expression (7), we get the growth of aggregate
capital input as a weighted average of its components’ growth rates:
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Wherei denotes the elasticity of aggregate capital input with respect to each asset type
and, under the assumption of perfect competition, equals the remuneration of each type of asset in
GDP (property compensation). These series, expressed in first differences, can be converted into a
yearly index by taking its exponential.
The ratio between the capital input and the capital stock provides a measure of capital’s
composition changes, or ‘quality’ of capital. The idea that technological change embodied in
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capital is captured by increases in the ‘quality’ of capital lacks consensus and has been often
rejected.15
Sensitivity tests
How robust are the new capital estimates to alternative computation methods? In
particular, are they sensitive to alternative initial capital values, price indices, and depreciation
rates?
Firstly, we tested the robustness of the capital stock series to alternative assumptions about
the initial level of capital stock. Thus, following Young (1995), we assumed that the capital stock
in 1850 was, alternatively, the one resulting from expression (3), double of such a level (the one
we favour), and zero. We found that the effects derived from choosing these alternative initial
capital levels fade away over time and the resulting series converge by 1890 (Figure 1). Thus,
over the years 1850-83, the growth rate of capital stock would have been 5.3 percent assuming
that its initial level (1850) was the one derived from expression (3), while with our favoured
estimate, that is, assuming twice as much this initial level, the rate of growth becomes 3.6 percent.
In the following long swing (1883-1920), the divergence is sharply reduced: with the alternative
growth rates being 2.5 and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Since in the construction of yearly capital series through the PIM approach it is quite
common to start from an independent capital stock estimate for a given year, a comparison
between the capital stock estimate we obtained through the PIM method and the one resulting
from Universidad Comercial de Deusto (UCD) (1968-1972) wealth survey for 1965, usually
employed to anchor annual series of capital estimates, has been carried out in Table 3.16 It can be
15 Cf. Young (1995: 649) and Abramovitz and David (2001: 23). For a less sceptic view, see
Hulten (1990: 134; 1992). Our historical estimates fit in the case exposed by Young (1995).
16 The UCD capital estimate for 1965 has provided the initial benchmark for capital stock
computations such as those by Myro (1983), Gómez Villegas (1988), Fundación BBV (1995),
Dabán et al. (1998), and Mas, Pérez, and Uriel (2000, 2005a, 2006).
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observed that the UCD estimates tend to exaggerate the size of capital stock, both for the
economy as a whole, and by type of asset, with the exception of transport equipment.17
[Table 3]
How sensitive are capital stock estimates to the degree of de-aggregation of the GFCF
series used in its construction? Since 1970 Spanish national accounts (CNE70) have distinguished
four types of assets (dwellings, other construction –including non residential buildings-, transport
equipment, and machinery and equipment) while previously national accounts (CNE58) allocated
residential and non residential buildings to the same category. Thus, it was possible to obtain
spliced homogeneous series for the four types of assets for the second half of the twentieth
century employing the CNE70 criteria. Capital formation for 1850-1958 distinguishes a larger
number of assets (Prados de la Escosura 2003). Therefore, a test of the robustness of the capital
stock estimates to alternative degrees of de-aggregation in the underlying investment series for
1850-1958 can be developed.
An interesting result is that the average service lives for non-residential construction and
for transport equipment differ between the alternative estimates as a result of assets’ composition
changes. Thus, the average useful lives for transport equipment rises to 36.9 and 27.9 years for
1850-1919 and 1920-59, respectively, from an average of 20 years assumed by Feinstein (1988).18
Likewise the inclusion of non-residential buildings (for which, as for dwellings, we assume 70
years of useful life) in ‘other constructions’ increases average service life in non-residential
17 Young (1995) pointed out similar situations in South Korea and Taiwan.
18 For transport equipment we accepted Feinstein’s (1988) service lives with slight modifications.
Thus, Feinstein (1988) assumes 30 years for railway stock, 25 years for ships, and 10 for cars and
trucks, with an average useful life of 10 to 20 years for the whole sector. In our case, we assume
40 years for railway stock up to 1919, and 30 for 1920-59, while we chose 30 and 10 for ships and
cars and trucks, respectively, over the entire span 1850-1959. From 1960 onwards our choice of
service lives matches the conventional estimates (see Table 1).
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structures from 50 to 55.7 and 54.7 years for 1850-1919 and 1920-59, respectively. As a
consequence, the resulting depreciation rates for these two kinds of assets are altered.
Although their long run trends do not differ significantly, the capital stock series
constructed from more de-aggregated GFCF series cast a higher level as a consequence of the
longer lives attributed to transport equipment and non-residential construction (Figure 2). In our
computations we have used the service lives that result from taking into account assets’
composition changes (Tables 1 and 2)
[Figure 2]
We also compared our “modified” geometric depreciation capital stock series with
alternative series computed with arithmetic (X = 1) depreciation rates.19 In Figure 3 and Table 4,
we present series constructed with these two alternative methodologies. It can be appreciated that
levels are higher in the straight-line depreciation series than in those computed with modified
geometric depreciation rates. This is not an unexpected outcome given the fact that geometric-
type depreciation results in a rapid decline during the early years of asset lives. Furthermore, the
modified geometric depreciation series exhibit more intense growth during the phases of
acceleration (the 1920s and the Golden Age, 1950-74) while the arithmetic depreciation estimates
grew more intensively in phases of slower growth (with the exception of 1850-83). In the long-
run, however, capital stocks derived through straight-line and modified-geometric depreciation
grew at the same pace. This fact renders our estimates robust to alternative depreciation rates.
[Table 4]
[Figure 3]
19 In the case of the arithmetic depreciation rate, gross capital stock for the period t is computed
as: GKt = GKt-1 + It – Rt, where It is real gross domestic capital formation, and Rt, retirements. Net
capital stock, with straight-line depreciation, can be estimated with expression (2), but the
depreciation rate will be=1/T.
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How sensitive are the results obtained to choice of the benchmark year? Usually capital
stock estimates are denominated in the currency of a given year, say, in 1995 US dollars, but is
this the outcome of computing capital stock with fixed set of prices from a single year (1995, in
our example), or is it just a ‘numeraire’ to express in homogeneous units the real value of a stock
derived from spliced capital series constructed at different sets of relative prices for different
periods? A single weighted index provides a good measure of real capital stock as long as the
relative price structure of capital assets over the time span considered does not differ significantly
from the one prevalent in base year. However, because of substantial over time changes in the
relative prices of capital goods —largely traceable to rapidly declining prices of machinery and
equipment—price weights for, say, 1995, would only be appropriate for a short period around this
year. For earlier years, the use of fixed 1995 price weights would understate the growth of capital
(the so called ‘Gerschenkron effect’), since the most dynamic capital goods grew faster as a
consequence (at least, in part) of the more intense decline in their relative prices. Conversely, the
growth of capital would be exaggerated if the prices for an early benchmark year were chosen.
[Figure 4]
Thus, we have employed prices from as many benchmarks as possible (1958, 1965, 1970,
1980, 1985 and 1995) and, for the time span between each pair of adjacent benchmark years (say,
1970-1980), we computed alternative capital stock series at the relative prices of each one (say, at
both 1970 and 1980 prices) and, then, spliced the two indices into a single one using a variable-
weighted geometric average, in which the weight assigned to each benchmark year’s series
increases the closer benchmark t is to each of the years considered. However, as can be seen in
Figure 4, the differences between fixed- and variable-weighted series are minimal, because the
underlining real GFCF series had already been obtained through splicing volume indices series
computed at the relative prices of different benchmark years (Prados de la Escosura 2003).
The comparison with available estimates for the last decades provides a final test for the
congruence of our results. Although no official capital statistics exist for Spain, scholars have
14
conducted, with disparate methods, independent investigations on the capital stock, including the
construction of long-term series.20
[Table 5]
Differences in growth rates among different series are not significant (Table 5).
Alternative historical reconstructions share similar trends with our new series. Differences are
noticeably, however, and for the first half of the twentieth century, Cubel and Palafox (1997)
suggest a more intense growth in the 1920s, while, in Hofman’s (1993) estimates, the faster
growth during the 1950s is compensated by the slower expansion after 1975. This last remark also
applies to the rest of the earlier estimates. Only the rates of growth for productive capital (that is,
excluding residential structures) are similar to our capital input growth since Spain’s admission
into the European Union (1986). We can, then, conclude that trends in capital stock (and input)
are quite robust to alternative computation methods and assumptions about depreciation rates and
service lives of assets.
Trends in capital stock and input
Trends in capital stock and its components are shown in Figure 5, while their average rates
of growth in each of the significant phases and long swings that can be distinguished in Spain’s
economic performance (Prados de la Escosura 2007) are presented in Table 6. Over the last 150
years, the capital stock grew, on average, at 3.5 percent per year, which implies that capital stock
doubled every 20 years. Machinery and transport equipment grew faster than the rest of capital
stock components and doubled every 14.5 years, while dwellings’ expansion was, instead, the
20 It is worth highlighting, in addition to the Universidad Comercial de Deusto (1968-1972) study
on the national wealth for 1965, Myro’s (1983) pioneering work in which the Jorgenson approach
was applied to Spain for the first time, and the research conducted by Mas, Pérez, and Uriel
(2005a, 2005b) at the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) under the
sponsorship of the Fundación BBVA, during the last two decades. Historical series produced by
Hofman (1993), Cebrián (2001) and, especially, Cubel and Palafox (1997) are worth mentioning.
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slowest one doubling only every 22 years. This implies a deep change in the composition of
capital stock over the long with a steady decline in the weight of the residential capital and an
increasing contribution of infrastructure and equipment (Figure 6). The relative size of dwellings
shrank from two thirds to over one third and, altogether, residential and non-residential structures
went down from representing nearly all of the capital stock to four-fifths by the end of the
twentieth century, while machinery and transport equipment increased their share by more than
six-fold over the same period.
[Figure 5]
[Table 6]
[Figure 6]
Capital stock and input did not follow a steady path as Figure 6 and Table 7 show, with a
more intense expansion during the Golden Age but not returning to the pre-1950 path of growth in
the last quarter of the twentieth century. Different phases can be distinguished in the evolution of
capital during the first hundred years of modern economic growth in Spain: an intense expansion
between the 1850s and the early 1880s, followed by a slowdown until World War I; then, growth
resumed briskly during the 1920s, was cut short in the early 1930s and remained sluggish until
1950. During the second half of the twentieth century capital accumulation grew at a faster and
steadier pace, with a big spurt in the years 1959-74.
[Table 7]
[Figure 7]
Changes in the composition of capital from residential structures toward productive capital
increased the service provided by the capital stock to production. This reflects into a growing gap
between growth rates of capital input and stock (Table 7 and Figure 7). The relative changes in the
capital stock implied modifications in the structure of capital compensation (Figure 8). By 1850,
capital compensation (the sum of all capital rents) accrued overwhelmingly to residential
structures (87 percent) while productive capital only received 13 percent of it. One and a half
16
centuries later, productive capital had increased its share to nearly 30 percent. In particular, the
share of machinery and equipment in capital rents trebled.
[Figure 8]
The difference between capital input and stock, that captures composition changes, is
sometimes identified with improvements in the ‘quality’ of capital stock.21 Interestingly, the
‘quality’ of capital rose in periods of faster capital growth (Table 7 and Figure 9). More
specifically, three periods in which capital ‘quality’ grew above its long-run trend stand out: from
the mid-1850s to the early 1880s, a period of opening up in which foreign capital was invested in
railways construction and in mining; the 1920s and early 1930s, that witnessed another episode of
capital inflow from abroad and the first phase of Spanish electrification; and the “Golden Age”
(1953-1974), in which Spain completed the process of electrification and replaced the old vintage
capital after two decades of international isolation due to the Great Depression, the Civil War
(1936-39) and the inward looking policies of Franco’s regime. It is worth nothing that in spite of
the large influx of European funds since Spanish accession to the European Union (1986), the
‘quality’ of capital did not rise well above the historical trend rate over 1986-2000, which could
suggest a delayed impact of ICT technologies on Spain (Timmer et al. 2005).
[Figure 9]
A glance at aggregate capital and its components shows a large variance in their rates of
growth over different long swings and cycles (Tables 6-7).
Institutional reforms and opening up to foreign capital and international trade favoured an
expansion during the first long swing, 1850-83. Inflows of foreign capital made it possible to
break the close connection between investment and savings and contributed to the economic
growth (Prados de la Escosura 2008). The capital stock grew at an average of 3.6 per annum, well
above the nineteenth century’s average but with irregular and pronounced cycles (Table 6, Panel
21 Alas, our historical exercise fails to capture all the composition -or ‘quality’- changes, as we cannot
carry out a deeper de-aggregation by type of asset, but hints into the direction of composition changes.
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C). The strong start (1855-66) was led by the railway construction, as evidenced by the dramatic
increase in transport equipment, although the expansion affected all types of capital goods. The
international crisis of 1866 reduced dramatically the influx of foreign capital that fuelled railways
expansion, while political turmoil (with two changes of political regime, social turmoil, coups
d’état and a civil conflict, the Carlist War) made Spanish economy less attractive for local and
foreign investment over 1866-73. The subsequent political stabilization that followed the
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty led to a recovery of capital stock growth rates, particularly in
transport equipment and machinery that grew at respectable rates closed to 6 percent per annum.
The second long swing 1883-1920, covers most of the so called Restauración (1875-
1923), an era of institutional stability that presumably provided a favourable environment for
investment and growth and yet both permanent and temporary factors worked against it. The
growth of capital stock slowed down to 2.3 percent per year with regular and mild cycles. Weak
urbanization, resulting from sluggish industrial growth and a delayed demographic transition,
slowed down the expansion of the stock of dwellings.22 The closing of a large section of the
railways network together with the disappointing financial results for railways companies
hindered a further expansion of non-residential structures (Herranz-Loncán 2007). Nonetheless, a
significant expansion occurred in machinery and equipment as industrialization proceeded
steadily during this period.
The Cuban War of Independence, despite the weak economic flows between the
metropolis and the colony, introduced macroeconomic instability that led to a contraction in
22 Restrictions on both internal and external competition, according to Fraile Balbín (1998)
counterweighted political and social stability. Cf. Tena (1999), Palafox (1999), and Pardos (1998) on
tariff protection and its effects. On the pace of industrialization and the demographic transition, see
Prados de la Escosura (2003) and Pérez Moreda (1999), respectively.
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foreign investment and the depreciation of the peseta since 1891 that, interestingly, had been
unaffected by the abandonment of the convertibility of Spain’s peseta into gold in 1883.23
In spite of Spanish neutrality during World War I capital stock growth rates declined by
about one third and, more prominently, machinery stock growth more than halved.24 As Sudrià
(1990) emphasized, the slowdown in the replacement of older vintages, associated to an
increasing utilization of the installed capacity, led to a rapid obsolescence of the machinery stock
in use.
The most intense growth of the period 1850-1950 was achieved in the 1920s. In this
decade, the growth rates of capital stock were the highest since the 1860s. As such an intense
growth took place under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1929), inevitably, economists
and historians have tended to assume that state intervention through external protection and
regulation, on the one hand, and investments in public infrastructure, on the other hand, made a
decisive contribution to capital accumulation, and, subsequently, to growth (Velarde 1968).
Against this view it has been argued that a) government intervention led to resource misallocation
because it did not take into account its opportunity cost (Comín 1987); b) the increasing power of
oligopolies reduced incentives for technological change (Fraile Balbín 1991); and c) the
expansion of public spending (through the increase in money supply and government debt) fuelled
inflation and increased currency volatility (Comín and Martin Aceña 1984, Palafox 1991). The
emphasis on tariff protectionism has tended to neglect, however, that a significant inflow of
23 Cf. Prados de la Escosura (2008) on the balance of payments; and Martín Aceña (1994) and Bordo
and Rockoff (1996) on the gold standard. On the consequences of Cuba’s war of independence, see the
discussion in Fraile and Escribano (1998) and Maluquer de Motes (1999).
24 This result is in stark contradiction with the conventional view that stresses its stimulating aggregate
effects. Cf. Roldán and García Delgado (1973) for the conventional view on the positive impact of the
Great War on Spain.
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foreign capital allowed the purchase of capital goods (Tena 1999, Prados de la Escosura 2008).25
A closer look at the evidence shows that growth rates in transport equipment, stimulated by the
Dictatorship’s infrastructure construction policy, exceeded largely those of the rest of capital
components.
The period 1929-1952 is the fourth, and last, long swing of the 1850-1950 era. The growth
rate of capital stock growth rate fell to 1.6 percent per year with irregular and severe cycles. A
deceleration in the capital stock growth between 1929 and 1935 was followed by stagnation
during the Civil and World Wars (1935-1944) and, then, a mild recovery up to 1952.
The first half of the 1930s represents a fracture in the intense capital stock expansion of the
previous decade. Our results suggest a moderate impact of the Depression in capital stock growth.
This result is not surprising and is in line with previous research (Comín, 1987; Prados de la
Escosura 2003). However, the effects of the crisis in Spain, although less intense than in European
countries until 1932, were most persistent, at least in comparison to those nations which managed
to leave the gold standard soon (Eichengreen 1992). This broad picture is complicated by the
disparate evolution of capital stock components. Uncertainty about a new political system, the II
Republic (1931-36), seems to have been a major cause for the decline in the growth of residential
structures, which returned to those prevalent before the 1920s. As a consequence of the restrictive
budgetary policy and the interruption of public works (Palafox 1991), transport equipment growth
declined to very low levels although, paradoxically, this was not the case of non-residential
structures which remained at levels similar to those observed in the 1920s.26 In a sharp contrast,
the increase in machinery stock exceeded that of the 1920s, suggesting that the social unrest and
25 It has also been noted that the positive situation of the current account balance of payments during the
First World War contributed to the boom of the 1920s (Sudrià 1990).
26 An alternative view sustaining that expansionary monetary and anti-cyclical fiscal policies were tried
to compensate for the fall in private investment and exports (Comín and Martín Aceña 1984, García
Santos and Martín Aceña 1990) could help explaining this apparent paradox.
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political turmoil did not slow down the renewal of industrial machinery, a likely outcome of the
electrification process that was taking place since the early 1920s.
Hardly any growth of aggregate capital stock took place during the Civil War and the
subsequent post-war years (1935-1944), a period in which the destruction of transport equipment
stands out. The impact of war destruction was very uneven, as was the immediate post-war
reconstruction. As observed above, while the stock of houses and structures was hardly affected
by the Civil War, the stock of machinery and, especially, of transport equipment fell significantly
(about one-fourth altogether). In the immediate post-war a vigorous rise in machinery and
equipment contrasted with none in transport equipment. In comparative perspective, western
European economies recovered faster from capital destruction during World War II than Spain did
from the Civil War (Maddison 1991).
The change in trend which began in the early1950s ushered in an exceptional phase of
rapid growth which lasted until 1974. Despite the fact that the volatility of import capacity
rendered investment risky and tended to penalise capital accumulation, while inflows of foreign
capital and new technology were restricted (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996), a dramatic
change in trend occurred in the 1950s. Machinery and transport equipment grew at rates above 7
percent per year while structures did it around 4 percent. It can be hypothesised that the U.S.-
Spanish cooperation agreements of 1953 triggered economic agents’ confidence in the viability of
Franco’s dictatorship leading to an increase in capital accumulation and to imports of new vintage
machinery and equipment (Calvo-González 2007).
The cautious move towards deregulation and opening up initiated in the mid-1950s
intensified after the 1959 stabilisation and liberalisation plan resulting in accelerated capital
accumulation during Spain’s Golden Age (1959-74). Capital stock growth reached peak rates (7
percent on average) and was particularly intense in the case of productive capital (that is,
excluding residential structures). The adoption of mass production techniques from abroad and the
diffusion of road transport appear crucial for this accelerated capital accumulation.
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A change in trajectory began in the late 1970s and reached to the end of the twentieth
century in which capital growth rates returned to those of the 1950s and early 1960s. It is worth
noting, nonetheless, that capital expansion maintained its Golden Age’s pace until 1978. This was
possibly due to the fact that relative prices did not adjusted immediately to the oil shocks as the
government implemented a policy of subsidies to soften the political transition from Franco’s
dictatorship to democracy. The severe economic adjustment introduced by Moncloa agreements
(1978) led to a deceleration in capital accumulation (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). The
last quarter of the twentieth century can be split into two periods with Spain’s accession to the
European Union as a turning point. The first one (1975-1986) was marked by the transition to
democracy and the re-organization of Spanish economy as capital equipment, largely obsolete and
energy-intensive, needed to be replaced. Since 1986 European funds largely contributed to the
construction of new infrastructures and the renewal of public transport equipment.
Capital deepening and productivity
How does the long-term rise in the stock and input of capital fit into the wider context of
Spain’s economic performance? A possible way to do it is by looking at capital intensity, which
relates the amount of capital to other factors of production, especially labour. Since the use of
capital makes labour more effective, rising capital intensity (or "capital deepening") pushes up the
productivity of labour.
In Spain, a process of capital deepening took place over the period 1850-2000 (Table 8):
the endowment of capital (stock and input) per hour worked, multiplied by 102 and 140,
respectively, while the rates of the second half of the twentieth century practically doubled those
prevailing in the previous hundred years. Also noticeable are the significant differences appeared
between these two measures of capital intensity.
[Table 8]
[Figure 10]
Another measure of capital intensity: the capital to output ratio multiplied by 4.5 and 6.2
for the stock and input, respectively. Interestingly, and contrary to Kaldor’s (1961: 178) stylised
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fact, the capital-output ratio did not remain stable over the long run in Spain.27 Different phases
can be described in its evolution (Figure 10). The capital-output ratio grew significantly over the
first hundred years considered (1850-1950) -with the exception of the 1920s- and, again, during
the last a quarter of the twentieth century but decreased during the “Golden Age” (1950-1974),
just at the time the growth of GDP was fastest. This exceptional situation in which the
productivity of capital (that is, the inverse of the capital-output ratio) increased suggests a
significant contribution of total factor productivity to Spanish economic growth over these years.
Spanish experience can be better assessed in international perspective. For different world
regions in the late twentieth century Table 9 compares growth rates for capital deepening and
capital productivity. In Panels A and B, our measures are constructed with inputs of capital and
labour, that is, the service provided to production by these two factors, while in Panel C stocks are
employed. The time spans considered are determined by the availability of international evidence,
not matching, thus, our favoured periodization.
Some results emerge from the comparison. In the context of OECD countries during the
Golden Age (1950-73) capital deepening does not appear to have increased particularly fast in
Spain: although she was in its upper growth segment during the 1950s, fell behind in the 1960s
and early 1970s, only remaining above North America. The productivity of capital increased
mildly in Spain, at much slower pace in the 1950s than in countries that suffered World War II
more profoundly. This raises the issue of Sapin’s sluggish recovery after the Civil War (1936-39).
For example, why starting from a lower level of capital did its productivity grow so slowly? Did it
result from a low human capital endowment or from resource misallocation in an over-regulated
autarchic economy? Conversely, during the years 1960-73 and after a cautious liberalisation and
opening up capital productivity grew in Spain while declined in Western Europe and Japan.
Panel B shows some interesting similarities between the East Asian ‘tigers’ and Spain in
the late twentieth century. In all of them, intense capital deepening went along with a significant
27 Maddison (1995) already observed the variance of the ratio of capital stock to GDP.
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decline in the productivity of capital. Finally, since 1960 Spain seems to be close to the top world
regions in capital intensity and also in terms of capital productivity decline.
Finally, a long-run perspective is provided in Table 10 in which trends in capital
deepening and productivity for Spain are compared to those in the United Kingdom and the
United States. At first glance it seems that, in the three countries, a growth rate of the capital-
labour ratio above 2 percent per year brings with it a decline in the productivity of capital.
A look at different phases or long swings suggests that capital intensity increased faster in
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Spain than in both the U.K. and the U.S. and,
correspondingly, the efficiency in the use of capital fell more acutely. In the 1920s, Spain
performed similarly to the U.S. (Panel B), with significant capital productivity gains while its
intensification kept growing. Electrification has been suggested as a major element underlying
capital productivity growth in the U.S. (David and Wright 1999) that, according to Field (2006),
concentrated in manufacturing. A similar hypothesis can be entertained for the case of Spain,
where the process of electrification, interrupted during the Civil War and its autarchic aftermath,
was completed in the 1950s, also underlies capital productivity growth (Betrán 2000, Sanchis
2006). Moreover, during the 1950s the introduction of new capital vintages under the umbrella of
the US-Spanish cooperation agreements, that stimulated investment and the acquisition of foreign
technology (Calvo-González 2007), also contributed to capital efficiency. New capital and
organizational improvements, together with increases in utilization rates, provided capital
efficiency gains during the 1960s and early 1970s. Nonetheless, once the Golden Age was over,
accelerated capital deepening was met again by declining capital efficiency in Spain.
Concluding Remarks
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, our measurement of capital stock in
the long-run yields only a range of best guess estimates. However, our sensitivity tests indicate
that differences in alternative capital stock estimates are fairly small and do not change the overall
picture. Capital stock estimation appears, then, much less problematic, and less sensitive to
underlining assumptions, than it is commonly believed. Second, we point out that capital input
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adjustments generate a slightly faster growth rates but do not change significantly long-run
performance of capital. Third, Spanish capital stock grew over the entire period (1850-2000) but
not at steady rates. Finally, Spain experienced a process of capital deepening and rising capital-
output ratios, although in phases of acceleration (the 1920s and the Golden Age) efficiency gains
in capital are found.
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Table 1
Assets Lives Estimates
Dwellings
Non-residential
structures
Transport
Equipment
Machinery &
Equipment
Myro (1983) 1965-1981 50 36 10 15
Hofman (1993) 1950-1992 50 40 15 15
IVIE (1995, 2002) 1964-2000 50 10 15
Cubel and Palafox (1997) 1901-1958 50 50 25 25
MOISSES (1996) 1954-1995 30 20 10 10
Jorgenson (1989) (U.S.) 70 40
Feinstein (1988) (U.K.) 1850-1920 100 80 10-20 25-40
Prados de la Escosura &
Rosés 1850-1919 70 55.7 36.9 30
1920-1959 70 54.7 27.9 20
1960-2000 70 40 15 15
Table 2
Depreciation Rates
1850-1919 1920-1959 1960-2000
Dwellings 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130
Other Constructions 0.0163 0.0166 0.0228
Transport equipment 0.0447 0.0591 0.1100
Machinery and equipment 0.0550 0.0825 0.1100
Sources: See text
Table 3
Perpetual Inventory Method versus Direct Estimation
(000 million of 1966 PTA.)
Prados de la
Escosura & Rosés
Universidad
Comercial de Ratio
PIM Deusto (UCD) (PIM/UCD)
Dwellings 994.1 1166.0 0.85
Other Constructions 961.8 1235.7 0.78
Transport Equipment 201.6 194.3 1.04
Machinery and Equipment 578.9 633.3 0.91
Capital Stock 2736.6 3229.3 0.85
Sources: PIM, see text; Universidad Comercial de Deusto (1968) derived by Myro (1983), Table 2.3.
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Table 4
Alternative Capital Stock Measures, 1850-2000
Modified
Geometric
Depreciation
Linear
Depreciation
(Gross stock)
Linear
Depreciation
(Net stock)
1850-2000 3.5 3.6 3.5
Long Periods
1850-1950 2.7 2.8 2.8
1951-1974 6.0 5.4 5.4
1975-2000 4.5 4.6 4.6
Long Swings
1850-1883 3.6 4.3 4.3
1884-1920 2.3 2.4 2.4
1921-1929 3.5 2.7 2.7
1930-1952 1.6 1.3 1.3
1953-1958 4.5 3.7 3.7
1959-1974 7.0 6.5 6.4
1975-1986 4.5 5.0 4.9
1987-2000 4.6 4.3 4.3
Cycles
1855-1866 5.4 5.9 5.9
1867-1873 1.6 2.8 2.8
1874-1883 3.0 3.3 3.3
1884-1892 2.2 2.7 2.7
1893-1901 2.3 2.6 2.6
1902-1913 2.6 2.4 2.4
1914-1920 1.7 1.9 1.8
1921-1929 3.5 2.7 2.7
1930-1935 2.2 1.8 1.8
1936-1944 0.1 0.3 0.3
1945-1952 2.7 2.1 2.1
1953-1958 4.5 3.7 3.7
1959-1964 5.0 4.8 4.8
1965-1974 8.2 7.5 7.4
1975-1978 6.9 6.9 6.8
1979-1986 3.3 4.0 4.0
1987-1992 5.2 4.6 4.6
1993-2000 4.1 4.2 4.2
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Table 5
Alternative Capital Estimates: Growth Rates (%)
Prados de la Escosura and Rosés Hofman Hofman Cubel/Palafox Cebrián
Stock Input Gross Stock Net Stock (Gross Stock) (Net Stock) (Net Stock)
(geometric depr) (geometric depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (geometric depr)
1951-1974 6.0 6.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.6
1975-2000 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.6
1921-1929 3.5 3.9 2.7 2.7 4.8
1930-1952 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 0.9
1953-1958 4.5 4.9 3.7 3.7 4.4 5.4 5.1
1959-1974 7.0 7.4 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.4
1975-1986 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.9 4.3 3.6
1987-2000 4.6 4.8 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.9
1902-1913 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.0
1914-1920 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.3
1921-1929 3.5 3.9 2.7 2.7 4.8
1930-1935 2.2 2.7 1.8 1.8 2.0
1936-1944 0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.3
1945-1952 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.3
1953-1958 4.5 4.9 3.7 3.7 5.1
1959-1964 5.0 5.4 4.8 4.8 5.0 6.0
1965-1974 8.2 8.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 8.2 5.7
1975-1978 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.0 5.7
1979-1986 3.3 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.5 2.5
1987-1992 5.2 5.5 4.6 4.6 4.1 3.9
1993-2000 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2
Myro Baiges et al. BDMORES MOISSES Mas et al. Mas et al. Mas et al. Timmer et al
(Gross Stock) (Net Stock) (Productive K) (Gross Stock)
(geometric depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (linear depr) (Productive K)
1951-1974
1975-2000 3.9 3.8 4.4
1921-1929
1930-1952
1953-1958
1959-1974 8.6
1975-1986 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.9
1987-2000 3.6 3.7 3.6 4.9 4.7
1902-1913
1914-1920
1921-1929
1930-1935
1936-1944
1945-1952
1953-1958
1959-1964 7.8
1965-1974 5.5 6.5 4.8 9.1 6.3 7.1 8.1
1975-1978 4.4 4.3 4.0 5.2 5.1 5.1 6.0
1979-1986 2.0 2.2 3.1 3.0 2.9
1987-1992 3.3 4.2 4.0 4.1 5.5 5.6
1993-2000 3.5 3.3 4.5 4.0
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Table 6
Capital Stock and its Components, 1850-2000: Growth Rates (%)
Dwellings
Other
Constructions
Transport
Equipment
Machinery &
Equipment
Capital
Stock
1850-2000 3.1 3.7 4.6 4.8 3.5
Long
Periods
1850-1950 2.5 2.8 3.4 3.8 2.7
1951-1974 5.5 6.1 8.6 7.9 6.0
1975-2000 3.5 5.0 5.7 5.9 4.5
Long
Swings
1850-1883 3.5 3.7 7.7 3.8 3.6
1884-1920 2.1 2.5 2.2 4.1 2.3
1921-1929 3.1 3.6 6.6 4.7 3.5
1930-1952 1.4 1.8 -2.1 3.3 1.6
1953-1958 4.4 3.5 7.6 7.7 4.5
1959-1974 6.2 7.5 9.8 8.3 7.0
1975-1986 3.8 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.5
1987-2000 3.2 4.9 6.5 7.2 4.6
Cycles
1855-1866 4.9 5.9 14.6 3.9 5.4
1867-1873 1.7 1.5 -1.1 1.9 1.6
1874-1883 2.8 3.0 5.2 5.7 3.0
1884-1892 1.9 3.1 -0.8 4.7 2.2
1893-1901 2.3 2.2 2.6 4.1 2.3
1902-1913 2.4 2.6 2.6 4.9 2.6
1914-1920 1.5 1.8 4.9 1.8 1.7
1921-1929 3.1 3.6 6.6 4.7 3.5
1930-1935 1.3 3.2 0.7 7.1 2.2
1936-1944 0.4 0.4 -5.9 -0.2 0.1
1945-1952 2.7 2.4 0.1 4.4 2.7
1953-1958 4.4 3.5 7.6 7.7 4.5
1959-1964 5.1 4.3 8.6 6.1 5.0
1965-1974 6.9 9.4 10.5 9.6 8.2
1975-1978 5.8 7.6 10.6 7.4 6.9
1979-1986 2.8 4.0 1.8 3.0 3.3
1987-1992 3.3 5.9 5.4 9.5 5.2
1993-2000 3.1 4.1 7.4 5.5 4.1
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Table 7
Growth Rates of Capital Stock, Quality and Input, 1850-2000 (%)
Capital
Stock
Capital
Quality
Capital
Input
1850-2000 3.5 0.2 3.7
Long
Periods
1850-1950 2.7 0.1 2.8
1951-1974 6.0 0.4 6.4
1975-2000 4.5 0.2 4.7
Long
Swings
1850-1883 3.6 0.3 4.0
1884-1920 2.3 0.1 2.4
1921-1929 3.5 0.4 3.9
1930-1952 1.6 -0.1 1.5
1953-1958 4.5 0.5 4.9
1959-1974 7.0 0.4 7.4
1975-1986 4.5 0.0 4.5
1987-2000 4.6 0.2 4.8
Cycles
1855-1866 5.4 0.8 6.3
1867-1873 1.6 -0.3 1.2
1874-1883 3.0 0.4 3.4
1884-1892 2.2 -0.1 2.2
1893-1901 2.3 0.1 2.4
1902-1913 2.6 0.2 2.8
1914-1920 1.7 0.2 2.0
1921-1929 3.5 0.4 3.9
1930-1935 2.2 0.5 2.7
1936-1944 0.1 -0.5 -0.4
1945-1952 2.7 0.0 2.7
1953-1958 4.5 0.5 4.9
1959-1964 5.0 0.4 5.4
1965-1974 8.2 0.4 8.6
1975-1978 6.9 0.2 7.0
1979-1986 3.3 0.0 3.2
1987-1992 5.2 0.3 5.5
1993-2000 4.1 0.2 4.3
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Table 8
Capital Intensity and Productivity, 1850-2000: Growth Rates (%)
Capital
Stock/
Capital
Input/ GDP/ GDP/
Hour
Worked
Hour
Worked
Capital
Stock
Capital
Input
1850-2000 3.1 3.3 -1.0 -1.2
Long Periods
1850-1950 2.1 2.3 -1.2 -1.4
1951-1974 5.0 5.4 0.5 0.1
1975-2000 4.9 5.1 -1.5 -1.7
Long Swings
1850-1883 3.0 3.3 -1.8 -2.2
1884-1920 2.1 2.2 -1.0 -1.1
1921-1929 1.7 2.1 0.3 -0.1
1930-1952 0.7 0.7 -0.7 -0.7
1953-1958 4.1 4.6 0.2 -0.2
1959-1974 6.4 6.8 -0.1 -0.5
1975-1986 8.1 8.1 -2.0 -2.0
1987-2000 2.2 2.5 -1.1 -1.4
Cycles
1855-1866 4.5 5.4 -4.1 -4.9
1867-1873 0.0 -0.3 1.8 2.1
1874-1883 3.6 3.9 -1.9 -2.3
1884-1892 1.8 1.7 -1.5 -1.4
1893-1901 1.8 1.9 -1.1 -1.2
1902-1913 2.4 2.6 -1.3 -1.5
1914-1920 2.2 2.4 0.0 -0.2
1921-1929 1.7 2.1 0.3 -0.1
1930-1935 0.5 1.0 -2.0 -2.5
1936-1944 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.1
1945-1952 1.7 1.7 -0.1 -0.1
1953-1958 4.1 4.6 0.2 -0.2
1959-1964 5.5 5.9 1.4 1.0
1965-1974 7.0 7.4 -1.1 -1.5
1975-1978 9.9 10.1 -3.1 -3.3
1979-1986 7.2 7.1 -1.4 -1.4
1987-1992 2.0 2.2 -1.1 -1.3
1993-2000 2.4 2.7 -1.2 -1.4
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Table 9
An International Comparison of Capital Deepening and Productivity: Growth Rates (%)
Panel A*
1950-1960 1960-1973
Capital-Labour GDP/Capital Capital-Labour GDP/Capital
Canada 5.7 -1.6 2.9 0.2
France 4.4 0.2 5.9 -0.4
Germany 5.3 1.3 7.7 -1.6
Italy 1.7 2.7 6.1 -0.6
Japan -0.3 3.6 8.8 -0.6
Netherlands 2.6 1.0 6.3 -1.0
U.K. 4.3 -1.2 4.6 -0.8
U.S.A. 3.5 -0.8 1.8 0.3
Spain* 4.1 0.3 4.5 0.2
Panel B*
1966-1990
Capital-Labour GDP/Capital
Hong Kong 5.1 -0.4
Singapore 6.3 -2.1
South Korea 7.5 -2.6
Taiwan 7.2 -2.4
Spain 5.6 -1.6
Panel C**
1960-2000
Capital-Labour GDP/Capital
World 2.9 -0.6
Industrial Countries 2.6 -0.4
China 4.9 -0.1
East Asia (except China) 6.6 -2.7
South Asia 2.9 -0.6
Latin America 1.7 -0.6
Africa 1.4 -0.8
Middle East 3.1 -1.0
Spain 5.3 -0.9
Notes: * Capital Input-Labour Input and GDP-Capital Input Ratios
** Capital Stock-Labour Quantity and GDP-Capital Stock Ratios
Sources: All countries but Spain, Panel A, Christensen et al. (1980); Panel B, Young (1995);
Panel C, Bosworth and Collins (2003). Spain, for capital, see the text, and for
labour, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2007).
40
Table 10
Long-run Capital Deepening and Productivity in the U.K., the U.S. and Spain: Growth Rates (%)
Capital-Labour GDP/Capital Capital-Labour GDP/Capital
U.K. Spain
Panel A*
1856-1873 1.9 0.3 3.1 -2.1
1873-1913 1.0 -0.1 2.4 -1.4
1913-1924 3.2 -1.0 2.2 0.2
1924-1937 0.3 0.4 2.9 -3.1
1937-1951 1.0 0.7 -0.9 1.4
1951-1973 3.7 -0.4 5.4 0.3
U.S.A. Spain
Panel B*
1889-1901 1.7 0.5 1.3 -0.7
1901-1919 1.7 0.0 2.6 -1.1
1919-1929 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.9
1929-1941 -0.2 2.5 0.8 -1.9
1941-1948 0.4 1.3 1.0 -0.4
1948-1973 2.7 0.2 4.8 0.4
1973-1989 2.6 -1.2 6.4 -1.5
1989-2000 2.5 -0.6 3.0 -1.5
Panel C**
1871-1891 0.4 -0.1 2.1 -0.8
1891-1913 0.5 0.6 1.7 -1.0
1913-1928 0.2 0.9 1.7 -0.2
1928-1950 -0.2 1.6 1.1 -1.2
1950-1964 1.9 0.4 3.2 1.3
1964-1972 3.5 -0.9 6.4 -1.4
1972-1979 2.3 -0.9 8.1 -2.9
1979-1988 2.4 -1.6 3.7 -0.7
1988-1996 -0.1 -0.4 3.9 -2.0
Notes: * Capital Stock-Labour Quantity and GDP-Capital Stock Ratios
** Capital Input-Labour Input and GDP-Capital Input Ratios
Sources: All countries but Spain, Panel A, Matthews et al. (1982);
Panel B, Field (2006); Panel C, Gordon (1999). Spain, for capital, see the text
and for labour, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2007)
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Figure 1: Capital Stock Estimates with Alternative Initial Levels, 1850-1913 (1958 million Pesetas)
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Figure 2: Capital Stock Estimates Constructed with Alternative De-aggregation of GFCF Series
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Figure 3: Capital Stock Estimates with Alternative Depreciation Rates
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Figure 4: Single (at 1990 prices) and Variable Weighted (Spliced) Capital Stock
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Figure 5: Trends in Capital Stock and its Components (semilog scale)
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Figure 6: Composition of Capital Stock (%) (1995 prices)
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Figure 7: Indices of Capital Stock and Input (1850 = 100)
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Figure 8: Capital Input. Shares of Rental Value
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Figure 9: Index of ‘Quality’ of Capital (1850 = 100)
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Figure 10: Capital Stock / Output Ratio
